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JIFs, giraffes, and a diffusion of culpability: A response to Osterloh and
Frey's discussion paper on ‘Borrowed plumes’
Ohid Yaqub
SPRU, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
1. A vestigial feature of the research system
The giraffe's laryngeal nerve is an absurdity. It connects the brain to
the voice box, taking a circuitous route all the way down the neck and
all the way back up again. Presumably, somewhere in the course of
history, it got caught up with the development of other organs, and now
takes a massive detour round the back of the aorta near the heart. It is
anything but elegant, and was clearly “not meant to be, but just hap-
pens to be” (Gould, 1993, p76). Disentangling the nerve would involve
the rearrangement of multiple organs simultaneously, and would be –
to use policy parlance – a multi-stakeholder issue.
The journal impact factor (JIF) is an absurdity. It connects two weak
bodies of understanding – citation theory and peer review theory – via a
circuitous route through the research system. The JIF was supposed to
assist librarians in curating their collection, and the underlying Citation
Index1 itself was supposed to help with searches and retrieval, but
somewhere in the course of history, they both got caught up in an in-
formation flood. They are now used to rank selectively, a purpose for
which they were certainly not designed. JIFs have ended up deeply
entangled in modern research systems, and implicated in important
pathologies of those systems.
Of course, the nerve remains functional for most giraffes, which is
more than can be said about JIFs in the research system, so the meta-
phor is a strained one. Even a cursory look at the JIF reveals many
reasons why it does not serve us well for ranking journals. It is a metric
that is unforgiving of disciplinary differences and journal styles, and
easily gamed by strategic authors, editors and publishers, to name just
some of the issues (Archambault and Larivière, 2009; Braun, 2012;
Martin, 2016). Perhaps most troubling is the idea that journal rankings
may now be shaping the direction and content of science (Rafols et al.,
2012; Muller and Rijke, 2017). Authors might complain about what is
needed to get published in high-JIF journals, whilst editors might la-
ment that submissions are becoming more homogenous. Journals cer-
tainly seem to shape and influence researchers’ behaviour. Economists
might not be willing to give their right arm for a publication in Amer-
ican Economic Review with its lofty stature, but the strength of their
preferences imply they would at least be willing to sacrifice more than
half a thumb (Attema et al., 2014)!2
Yet, the metaphor does serve to illustrate a choice for addressing the
current malaise in research policy. Should we ‘muddle through’, à la
Lindblom (1959), tinkering with modified JIFs, using them in combi-
nation with other metrics, playing the arms race with those who seek to
game them?3 Or should we seek radical disentanglement from JIF, or
indeed from journal rankings by any measure? Within this context,
Osterloh and Frey (2020) do us an important service by asking why, for
all its problems, journal rankings based on JIFs are still so influential.
Moreover, they offer some suggestions for reform, some more radical
than others.
In this note, I wish to focus on two points of difference between
Osterloh and Frey, and myself. The first is the degree to which JIF lock-
in can be explained exclusively by ‘borrowed plumes’. The second is the
degree to which their suggested reforms are sufficiently radical but too
narrow in scope. Considering these two points, which turn out to be
somewhat intertwined, will help to characterise what is really at stake.
What is at stake is not so much how journal rankings affect academics
and their careers (“top publications are decisive for academic careers”),
but rather how well the research system interacts with and serves so-
cietal goals. Osterloh and Frey may well have identified one source of
JIF lock-in, but I shall submit that there are other culprits, too, both
within and beyond academia. Some are more culpable than others,
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2 Are journals evolving in response to the authors’ submission patterns? There is a hypothesis worth exploring: ‘Top journals’ may be growing their editorial boards
and broadening their remit, so that they can cater for a more diverse range of interests under a single journal name, in what was previously accommodated through
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3 For example, in response to carefully documented self-citation practices, intuitive policy recommendations can emerge, namely to develop modified journal-
metrics and individual-metrics that exclude self-citations (Seeber et al., 2019; Wilhite et al., 2019).
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2. The degree to which JIF lock-in can be explained by ‘borrowed
plumes’
Osterloh and Frey (2020) begin by drawing our attention to one
particular property of the JIF: skewed distributions. In general, a few
papers in a given journal are much more highly cited than the rest of its
papers. The authors of the rest of the papers, it is claimed, benefit from
‘borrowed plumes’ and are therefore likely to be reluctant to change.
Blaming our inertia largely on free-riding authors, however, neglects a
myriad of other kinds of ‘borrowed plumes’ that might exist and un-
derstates the broader systemic nature of JIF lock-in.
As a property of science, skewed distributions have been observed
widely. Citation distributions across journals are skewed, citation dis-
tributions across papers within journals are skewed, citation distribu-
tions across authors are skewed, and citations distributions within au-
thors’ own portfolios of papers are skewed. We have known for a long
time that authorship itself is also skewed; most authors publish rela-
tively little while a few publish prodigiously (Lotka, 1926).
Arguably, much of the scientific enterprise might be said to run on
‘borrowed plumes’. One might free-ride on supervisor pedigree, in-
stitutional brand-name, the reputation of co-authors, funding source
prestige, or the generosity of peer reviewers, or indeed bask in the re-
flected glory of the field as a whole (witness the snake-oil salesmen
rushing to call themselves economists amongst politicians). The re-
wards are so extremely unevenly distributed that one author has even
drawn a parallel here between the academic community and drug gangs
(Afonso, 2014).4
Conversely, in the Mathew Effect, the plumes can be blown in the
reverse direction, such that the superstars reap cumulative advantage
from their earlier work, and from the toils of technicians, graduate
students, and administrative assistants. They probably garner more
than their ‘fair share’ of citations too, once they have acquired the aura
of elite high-status (Azoulay et al., 2013). Hence, to take umbrage at
this one particular set of borrowed plumes arising from the JIF, I would
suggest, distracts attention from the fact that there is already in place an
extremely stratified system of rewards and incentives for researchers -
journal rankings merely uphold and exaggerate these inequalities.
Moreover, as a verdict on the acquiescence of authors of the papers who
get cited less than their respective JIF, it seems a rather harsh one, and
sets a stern threshold for who should be held complicit.
Where to start the list then? Perhaps a great source of responsibility
lies with those who incorporate the JIF into their broader rankings of
journals, researchers, departments and entire universities. Rankings can
introduce dysfunctionalities over time as measures become targets5
and, irrespective of whether they are initially misrepresentative or not,
they can gain credence over time, as Mertonian self-fulfilling pro-
phecies kick in:
“Law school faculties and the smart administrators all go, ‘This is a
bunch of hooey. We don't care about this.’ Until they drop and the
board of trustees says, ‘Hey, you're dropping; why should we give
you more money?’ and the board of visitors say, ‘Man, your school's
really going to pot. You haven't changed a thing… big changes need
to be made here.’ And your monetary support from alumni say,
‘Well, I'm not sure I want to support a school that's going in the
wrong direction,’ and your money starts to dry up. And you think,
‘we can't afford to lose funding, or else it will spiral downhill and we
will be a worse law school. So keeping up numbers is key.” (Quoted
in Espeland and Sauder, 2007, p13)
Might the new breed of university managers be responsible? If
rankings are thought to be credible, and capable of controlling the fate
of a university, school or department, those rankings may be in-
corporated directly into the ‘key performance indicators’ of university
managers, or even codified into their employment contracts and re-
muneration packages. The cadre of managers may then be tempted to
do what it takes to maintain and rise up the rankings in order to execute
their duties. Implicit pressures to encourage manuscript submissions to
‘top journals’, which researchers might already be feeling anyway, can
become explicit bonus payments for publication in certain select out-
lets, or turn into the threat of dismissal without publication in suffi-
ciently high-JIF journals.
Moreover, if there are activities in the university or school that have
nothing to do with publishing in high-JIF journals, and are not included
in the rankings, management might be tempted to withdraw support for
them. Some might say, just create a new set of rankings that measure
what is desired, for example, a renewed focus on impact and service.
Putting aside the diversity and politics of what might constitute impact
and service, such an argument would overlook the ways in which
rankings encourage homogeneity. Schools become more like what is
measured. Public policy schools, business schools, law schools, and
medical schools start to the look the same as each other, their character
differences ironed out into top-tier and lower-tier schools. What might
have made a school distinctive, survives only if it can be framed as a
source of competitive advantage.
Rankers might remind us that they, too, have a responsibility to
their audience, that there is a market for their service, warts and all. If
they did not offer it, someone else would probably step into the market.
So the users and consumers of rankings are enveloped in this mess, too.
Those who might defer to rankings – funders allocating grants to re-
searchers; committees deciding on recruitment, promotion and prizes;
students and their parents choosing where to study; governments lim-
iting where their scholarships can be used – suddenly become drawn
into a vast web of diffused evaluation culpability.
Even those who might refrain from using such rankings do not es-
cape unsullied, since one only has to be suspected of taking a sneaky
peek at them, for it to prompt reactive behaviour. Witness, for example,
the UK Research Excellence Framework panels insisting that they do
not allow journal name, let alone journal rankings, to affect their
judgments. Given that the REF's funding allocation and status rewards
are now skewed even more heavily towards quality of publications
rather than quantity, anxiety about how quality will be judged is to be
expected. The correlation between REF peer review and journal rank-
ings may be weak for now (HEFCE, 2015; p32), but there is a danger of
this ending up as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
More broadly, the pressure to select and concentrate has become
stronger, yet the appetite to engage seriously in evaluation, and to fund
it properly, has not grown with the same fervour. The shift from stea-
dily growing science to steady-state science has resulted in competition
for ever more limited resources. The decline in institutional funding has
left universities vying for tuition fees and its researchers jostling for
short-term project funding. Meanwhile, as the number of manuscripts
being generated and submitted for publication has increased, no doubt
in part because this is a performance indicator, evaluation and selection
mechanisms are coming under greater stress. This is perhaps more
acute than it needs to be because publishers under-fund evaluation and
selection, preferring to rely on the freely donated time of editors and
peer reviewers.
The appetite for investing in evaluation ought to be stronger than it
is, not just among publishers but more generally, too. Under such
4 However (and I say this without irony), this claim does not appear to have
got past peer review in its original form in that this working paper has yet to be
published.
5 This is widely recognised. See for example, Goodhart's Law (quoted in
Martin, 2016; p6); Campbell's Law (1979, and quoted in Espeland and
Sauder, 2007, p3); metrics as ‘distortions’ of university management
(Muller, 2018, p23 and p67); ‘performativity’ in markets (Callon, 1998;
Mackenzie, 2006); and ‘audit culture’ in accounting and actuary (Porter, 1996,
p89; Power, 1997, p15).
O. Yaqub Research Policy 49 (2020) 103868
2
conditions, it becomes tempting to reach for evaluation ‘short-cuts’, or
to use Dr Wooding's term, heuristics. As Wooding (2020) suggests, there
is simply too much at stake for research to be left unevaluated, so there
will always be a need to ensure people do not feel left at sea, largely
unguided as to which heuristics to use.
3. The degree to which the suggested reforms are radical but
narrow
Osterloh and Frey's suggestions for reform are radical but narrow:
open post-publication review; publication of citation distributions; ‘take
it or leave it’ publication decisions (i.e. no revisions); and randomisa-
tion (whenever there is reviewer disagreement). They are admirably
weighed up with a series of carefully thought-through advantages and
disadvantages, which do not need repeating here (not least because the
arguments there have already been sharpened through peer review!).
Suffice it to say that the first two suggestions are already in partial
operation, and the third speeds up review but somewhat undervalues
the contributions that reviewers can make in suggesting improvements
(Starbuck, 2003; Casnici et al., 2017).
The fourth option of partial randomisation triggers a number of
questions, some of which have been answered but others not: Would
this encourage yet more speculative manuscript submissions, knowing
that they need only satisfy a single reviewer to enter a lottery? Would
this change the behaviour of reviewers if they knew they could uni-
laterally consign a manuscript to a lottery? Are editors no longer to play
a role in at least trying to understand the sources of author-reviewer
disagreements or reviewer–reviewer disagreements, and the different
criteria by which reviewers may be evaluating the quality or originality
of the contribution? Does this relegate editors to being mere adminis-
trators and processors of papers, rather than active custodians of their
community's publishing activities?
I am not sure how to answer these questions, but they do need
careful consideration before a major overhaul. Swapping the biases and
challenges of editing a journal for randomising a significant portion of a
journal does seem to imply a rather strong indictment of editorial
judgement. It remains to be seen whether this is what readers want, or
what the editors who serve them want. At present, there is little in-
centive for publishers and editors to even experiment with Osterloh and
Frey's proposition. Oswald (2020) lays out one rationalisation, but it
involves a rather literal take on citations (requiring one to value cita-
tions for citations’ sake, “admittedly just one criterion”). The extent to
which reviewers’ and editors’ view of high-impact is basically equated
to potential for citations is unknown, but some journal rankings cer-
tainly apply reductive pressure in that direction. If Oswald's starting
assumptions are not valid now, they may yet become valid, when
chasing citations becomes the new orthodoxy.
If unorthodox views are in danger, however one chooses to define
that, editors should in principle be able to over-rule reviewers and
publish anyway. When they don't, unorthodox ideas in the past have
sometimes been reason for setting up a new journal. Some journals can
establish a leading reputation quite quickly; this journal is coming up to
fifty years, but I'm sure many will be able think of younger examples
that are also very good. Today's tendency to rank journals probably
makes striking out with a new journal much harder than in years gone
by, but despite this, it has not stopped the continued birth of new
journals.
It remains unclear whether it is journal ranking by JIF or journal
ranking by any measure that is objectionable to Osterloh and Frey.
Compared to the DORA (2012) declaration and the Leiden Manifesto
(Hicks et al., 2015), which are setting new social norms in science and
its institutions (a set of standards that can be used to shame and revere
in equal measures is perhaps nowhere more useful than on social media
platforms); and compared to the Metric Tide report (Wilsdon et al.,
2015), which is focussing policymakers’ attention on the pernicious
effects of the JIF and the wide ranging implications for research
assessment more broadly, the Osterloh and Frey reforms risk appearing
to be an esoteric debate within the ivory tower about an arcane system
of promotions and publishing. Rather than taking aim at authors-cited-
below-their-JIF-scores and their journal editors, the intended audiences
of the DORA declaration, the Leiden manifesto and the Metric Tide have
deliberately been much wider.
These reforms are broader in scope, but also less radical in that they
do not seek to dismantle the journal system that has evolved, and do not
try to break free from journal-ranking in its entirety. Rather, they im-
plicitly accept a weak form of journal hierarchy (for example, at the
very least seeking to distinguish scholarly journals from a growing
range predatory journals whose only editorial concern is to extract rents
from the academic market by charging gullible authors, or those des-
perate to get a ‘publication’ regardless of the journal). They don't ignore
the arms race referred to earlier, between those who develop (“a basket
of”) metrics and those who seek to game them; they seek for it to be
governed, via multiple stakeholders, with all the perils that may entail,
in the hope that diversity might be respected amidst a weaker form of
hierarchy. The JIF might yet be governed into an irrelevance. Reform
need not be radical and risky; there is merit in having broad reach.
The latest in this stream of work has been the suggestion of a gov-
erning body of journals (perhaps to fill the vacuum left by those pre-
occupied with extraordinary rent-seeking).
“All stakeholders in the system share responsibility for the appro-
priate construction and use of indicators, but in different ways. We
therefore suggest the creation of an inclusive governing organiza-
tion that would focus on journal indicators.” (Wouters et al., 2019;
p622)
This seems both feasible and promising. Perhaps one of the first
items on their agenda ought to be supporting further work on citation
theory and peer review theory, if only to help maintain that knowledge
base and garner wider appreciation for the literature that already exists.
For example, known variations in citation practices are too often
overlooked (Elkana et al., 1978; Cozzens, 1989; Wouters, 1999). And,
the expectation that peer review should yield consensus seems far too
strong, given how differently we know that people can read the same
document (c.f. the three responses here to the same Osterloh and Frey
manuscript) (Darnton, 1986; Chubin and Hackett, 1990; Csiszar, 2016).
We must endeavour to offer more than superficial answers to these
questions: What are journals for? What is peer-review? And what is a
citation?
Our answers will require continual updating if histories of reading,
print culture, journals, peer review, citation culture are anything to go
by. So we do need a forum for discussing what we think a citation is,
what journals are for, and what peer review does. Such discussions
could inform, and be informed by, problems facing research evaluation
practitioners. For example, evaluators grapple with the unit of analysis
(which evaluation techniques are appropriate for which level of re-
search aggregation?) and the degree of commensurability (should a
citation from a student be weighted the same as one from a Nobel
laureate, or citations from a blog the same as one from a newspaper?),6
in addition to the perennial concerns about the purpose of evaluation
(summative, formative, accountability, and so forth) (Marjanovic et al.,
2017).
This is, of course, not the first time that communities have en-
countered the sensation of information overload and the need for se-
lection systems (Blair, 2010). The invention of the printing presses
might well be considered as nothing less than an information revolution
by some (Eisenstein, 1979), but it was not without a concomitant
evolution in the governing institutions that shaped publishing, reading
and censorship (Johns, 1998). The idea of a governing body is
6 Citations can be ‘normalised’ to account for variations, like field of study or
career stage, but the underlying question is theoretical: what is ‘normal’?
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reminiscent (to me at least, since I have not spoken in respect of this to
any of the authors of Wouters et al., 2019) of the Company of Stationers
in its heyday, whose royal charter in 1557 set out a definition of
“proper conduct”:
“To be a Stationer meant adopting a distinctive cultural identity…
that conditioned how every individual Stationer perceived his or her
knowledge, conduct and action. By comparison, categorization into
‘bookseller’, ‘printer’ or ‘wholesaler’ – let alone ‘publisher’ or ‘editor’
– was relatively unfamiliar. Such terms possessed nothing like the
resonance of ‘Stationer’. [They] acted first and foremost as
Stationers and it was as Stationers that they and their actions were
judged… The decisions structuring print culture were over-
whelmingly Stationers’ decisions, arrived at by reference to
Stationers’ perspectives. Their interests and practices therefore had
direct implications for virtually all learned activities.” (Johns, 1998;
p59).
To sum up, explanations for JIF lock-in ought to go beyond ‘bor-
rowed plumes’. JIFs, journal rankings, and other forms of ranking, spin
a web that catches many actors. It seems sensible to focus on reform
that has potential for wide reach. Randomisation in the face of JIF may
carry unintended consequences and may not succeed in dislodging the
desire for journal rankings by some other measure(s). It should wait
until we have more widely appreciated theory on peer review and ci-
tation, more inclusive governing bodies that can wield some influence
over rankings and their users, and a stronger appetite for investing in
evaluation. For the time being at least, we might learn to live with JIFs
by engaging with a wide range of stakeholders, and without the need
for such a radical shake-up of the journal system. It is not just giraffes
who have managed to live with the laryngeal nerve – humans have too.
Declaration of Competing Interest
None.
Acknowledgements
I acknowledge funding from European Research Council Starting
Grant 759897. I thank Ben Martin, the Editor of this (virtual) Special
Section, for helpful comments. All errors are my own.
References
Afonso, A., 2014. How academia resembles a drug gang. Retrieved July 30, 2019,
Available at https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2407748.
Archambault, E., Larivière, V., 2009. History of the journal impact factor: contingencies
and consequences. Scientometrics 79 (3), 635–649.
Attema, A.E., Brouwer, W.B.F., Van Exel, J., 2014. Your right arm for a publication in
AER? Economic Enquiry 52 (1), 495–502.
Azoulay, P., Stuart, T., Wang, Y., 2013. Matthew: effect or fable? Manage Sci 60 (1),
92–109.
Blair, A., 2010. Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern
Age. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Braun, T., 2012. Editorial. Scientometrics 92 (2), 207–208.
Callon, M., 1998. The Laws of the Markets. Blackwell, Oxford.
Casnici, N., Grimaldo, F., Gilbert, N., Dondio, P., Squazzoni, F., 2017. Assessing peer
review by gauging the fate of rejected manuscripts. Scientometrics 113 (1), 533–546.
Chubin, D., Hackett, E., 1990. Peerless Science: Peer Review and U. S. Science Policy.
SUNY, New York.
Cozzens, S., 1989. What do citations count? Scientometrics 15 (5–6), 437–447.
Csiszar, A., 2016. Peer review: troubled from the start. Nature 532, 306–308.
Darnton, R., 1986. First steps toward a history of reading. Aust. J. Fr. Stud. 23 (1), 5–30.
DORA(San francisco declaration on research assessment), 2012. Retrieved July 30, 2019,
from https://sfdora.org.
Eisenstein, E., 1979. The Printing Press as an Agent of Change. CUP, Cambridge.
Elkana, Y., Lederberg, J., Merton, R.K., et al., 1978. Toward a Metric of Science: The
Advent of Science Indicators. Wiley, New York.
Espeland, W., Sauder, M., 2007. Rankings and reactivity. Am. J. Soc. 113 (1), 1–40.
Gould, S., 1993. Eight Little Piggies. Norton, New York.
HEFCE, 2015. The Metric Tide: Correlation analysis of REF2014 Scores and Metrics
(Supplementary Report II to the Independent Review of the Role of Metrics in
Research Assessment and Management). HEFCEhttps://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.
3362.4162.
Hicks, D., Wouters, P., Waltman, L., et al., 2015. Bibliometrics: the leiden manifesto for
research metrics. Nature 520, 429–431.
Johns, A., 1998. The Nature of the Book. CUP, Chicago.
Lindblom, C.E., 1959. The science of “muddling through”. Publ. Adm. Rev. 19 (2), 79–88.
Lotka, A., 1926. The frequency distribution of scientific productivity. J. Washington Acad.
Sci. 16 (12), 317–324.
MacKenzie, D., 2006. An engine. Not a Camera: How financial Models Shape Markets.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Marjanovic, S., Cochrane, G., Robin, E., et al., 2017. Evaluating a complex research ca-
pacity-building intervention: reflections on an evaluation of the African Institutions
Initiative. Evaluation 23 (1), 80–101.
Martin, B., 2016. Editors’ JIF-boosting stratagems –which are appropriate and which not?
Res. Policy 45 (1), 1–7.
Muller, J.Z., 2018. The Tyranny of Metrics. Princeton University Press, NJ.
Muller, R., Rijke, S., 2017. Thinking with indicators. Exploring the epistemic impacts of
academic performance indicators in the life sciences. Res. Eval. 26 (3), 157–168.
Osterloh, M., Frey, B., 2020. How to avoid borrowed plumes in academia. Res. Policy 49,
103831 (this virtual Special Section).
Porter, T., 1996. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life.
Princeton University Press, NJ.
Power, M., 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, UK.
Rafols, I., Leydesdorff, L., O’Hare, A., Nightingale, P., Stirling, A., 2012. How journal
rankings can suppress interdisciplinary research: A comparison between Innovation
Studies and Business & Management. Res. Policy 41 (7), 1262–1282.
Seeber, M., Cattaneo, M., Meoli, M., et al., 2019. Self-citations as strategic response to the
use of metrics for career decisions. Res. Policy 48 (2), 478–491.
Starbuck, W., 2003. Turning lemons into lemonade: where is the value in peer reviews? J.
Manag. Inquiry 12 (4), 344–351.
Wilhite, A., Fong, E., Wilhite, S., 2019. The influence of editorial decisions and the
academic network on self-citations and journal impact factors. Res. Policy 48 (6),
1513–1522.
Wilsdon, J., Allen, L., Belfiore, E. et al. (2015). The metric tide: report of the independent
review of the role of metrics in research assessment and management. doi:10.13140/
RG.2.1.4929.1363.
Wouters, P., 1999. Citation Culture. UAP, Amsterdam.
Wouters, P., Sugimoto, C., Larivière, V., et al., 2019. Rethinking impact factors. Nature
569, 621–623.
O. Yaqub Research Policy 49 (2020) 103868
4
